CEPR Working Paper: Out with the New, In with the Old? Bank Supervision and the Composition of Firm Investment

Author(s): Miguel Ampudia, Thorsten Beck and Alexander Popov Date: June 2021 Abstract: Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks remaining under national supervision, firms borrowing from SSM-supervised banks reduce intangible assets and increase tangible assets and[…]

SSRN Working Paper: “Crime and Punishment?” How Russian Banks Anticipated and Dealt with Global Financial Sanctions

Author(s): Mikhail Mamonov, Steven Ongena and Anna Pestova Date: May 2021 Abstract: We study the impact of global financial sanctions on the Russian banks and economy. Financial sanctions were consecutively imposed between 2014 and 2019, allowing potentially-targeted (but not yet sanctioned) banks to adjust their international and domestic exposures. Compared to similar other banks, targeted[…]

SSRN Working Paper: The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test

Author(s):Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena and Cosimo Pancaro Date:June 2021 Abstract: Using a difference-in-differences approach and relying on confidential supervisory data and an unique proprietary data set available at the European Central Bank related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has[…]

June 2021: New VoxEU Column – Centralised bank supervision and the composition of firm investment

By Miguel Ampudia, Thorsten Beck, Alexander Popov The trade-off between stability and growth has long been a subject of policy debate and informs views on the extent to which the supervision of banks should be centralised. This column presents analysis of the ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism, using the announcement of the mechanism and its implementation[…]

June 2021: New VoxEU Column – “Crime and Punishment”: How Russian banks anticipated and dealt with global financial sanctions

By Mikhail Mamonov, Anna Pestova and Steven Ongena Financial sanctions against Russia’s state-owned and controlled banks were imposed consecutively between 2014 and 2019, allowing banks that would potentially be targeted in the future to adjust their international and domestic exposures. This column explores the informational effects of financial sanctions, showing that compared to similar private[…]

June 2021: New VoxEU Column – The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-wide Stress Test

By Christoffer Kok, Carola Müller, Steven Ongena and Cosimo Pancaro Since the financial crisis, stress tests have become an important supervisory and financial stability tool. Relying on confidential data available at the ECB, this column presents novel evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated with stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. Banks that participated[…]

June 2021: New VoxEU Column – Banking on experience

By Hans Degryse, Sotirios Kokas and Raoul Minetti Since the financial crisis, stress tests have become an important supervisory and financial stability tool. Relying on confidential data available at the ECB, this column presents novel evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated with stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. Banks that participated in the[…]

June 2021: New BIS Quarterly Review article – Enhancing the BIS government bond statistics

By Bilyana Bogdanova, Tracy Chan, Kristina Micic and Goetz von Peter This statistical feature presents a new data set on long-term debt securities issued by central and general governments in domestic and foreign currencies. It combines national aggregates with data on international issuance and BIS estimates, for improved coverage across all markets of issue. The[…]

SSRN Working Paper: Banking on Experience

Author(s): Hans Degryse, Sotirios Kokas and Raoul Minetti Date: June 2021 Abstract: We study the impact of different dimensions of banks’ experience on the extent of banks’ moral hazard in loan markets. Using rich U.S. corporate loan-level data, we find that banks’ prior experience with borrowers and co-lenders reinforces their monitoring incentives. Banks’ sectoral experience,[…]