Internationally active banks can be a source of systemic risk as a default of one bank can easily spill over to banks in other countries. This implies that financial market stability in one country influences stability in another country. For this reason, different countries should have an incentive to cooperate. However, regulation and supervision of banks are still more present on the national than on the supranational level. On the one hand, the recent crisis has shown that regulation and supervision limited to the national level are not sufficient to prevent financial instabilities. On the other hand, different countries are very heterogeneous. For this reason, it will not be possible to align supranational regulation and supervision with banking sector specific characteristics of individual countries. The following research papers are focusing on how to implement regulation and supervision across countries. Thereby, they also discuss the tradeoff regarding regulation and supervision on the national and supranational level.
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Working and discussion papers
Altavilla, C., M. Boucinha, J.-L. Peydro, F. Smets (2020). Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers. CEPR Discussion Paper DP14288
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Beck, T., E. Carletti, and I. Goldstein (2016). Financial Regulation in Europe: Foundations and Challenges. CEPR Discussion Papers 11147.
Bostandzic, D., and G. N. F. Weiss (2013). Why do U.S. banks contribute more to global systemic risk? SFB 823 Discussion Paper Nr. 36/2013.
Calzolari, G., J.-E. Colliard and G. Loranth (2016). Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision. CEPR Discussion Paper 11326.
Cao J. and V. Dinger (2018). Financial Globalization and Bank Lending: The Limits of Domestic Monetary Policy? Norges Bank Working Paper 04/2018
Carletti, E., G. Dell’Ariccia and R. Marquez (2015). Supervisory incentives in a banking union. Mimeo.
Colliard, J.-E. (2015). Optimal supervisory architecture and financial integration in a banking union. ECB Working Paper 1786/2015.
Colliard, J.-E., and C.-P. Georg (2020) Measuring Regulatory Complexity. CEPR Discussion Paper DP14377.
Dávila, E., and A. Walther (2017). Does Size Matter? Bailouts with Large and Small Banks. NBER Working Paper No. 24132.
De Marco, F., and T. Wieladek (2016). The Real Effects of Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy: Evidence from the United Kingdom. CEPR Discussion Paper 11265.
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Faia, E., and B. Weder (2016). Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks: Bail in Under Single Point of Entry Versus Multiple Points of Entry. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11171.
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Obstfeld, M. (2020). Globalization Cycles. CEPR Discussion Papers 14378
Schilling, L. M. (2019). Too Many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts. CEPR Discussion Papers DP14243
Steinkamp, S., A. Tornell, and F. Westermann (2017). The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening. CESifo Working Paper No. 6670.
Walther, A. and L. White (2019) Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14048
Allen, F., E. Carletti, and J. Gray (2013). Political, fiscal and banking union in the Eurozone? Conference at the EUI in Florence.
Allen, F., T. Beck, E. Carletti, P. R. Lane, D. Schoenmaker and W. Wagner (2011). Cross-border banking in Europe: Implications for financial stability and macroeconomic policies. www.voxeu.org.
Beck, T. (ed.) (2012). Banking union for Europe – Risks and challenges. VoxEU eBook.
Beck,T., W. Wagner, and R. Todorov (2012). Cross-border banking and national supervision – is there a conflict? www.voxeu.org.
Bremus, F., and C. Lambert (2014). Banking union and bank regulation: Banking sector stability in Europe. DIW Economic Bulletin 4(9): 29-39.
Costello, A.M., and J. Granja, and J. Weber (2015). Do strict regulators increase the transparency of the banking system? Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620853.
Forbes, K., D. Reinhardt and T. Wieladek (2016). The Spillovers, Interactions, and (Un)Intended Consequences of Monetary and Regulatory Policies. NBER Working Paper No. 22307.
Hills, R., D. Reinhardt, R. Sowerbutts and T. Wieladek (2016). Cross-border regulatory spillovers: How much? How important? What sectors? Lessons from the United Kingdom. BoE Staff Working Paper No. 595.
Ichiue, H. ; Frederic Lambert (2016). Post-crisis International Banking : An Analysis with New Regulatory Survey Data. IMF Working Paper No. 16/88.
Kahn, C. M., and J.A. Santos (2002). Allocating lending of last resort and supervision in the Euro area. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=310542.
Lane, P. R. (2015). Cross-border financial linkages: Identifying and measuring vulnerabilities. www.voxeu.org.
Leitner, Y. (2014). Should regulators reveal information about banks? Business Review Q3 2014. www.philadelphiafed.org.